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COMMENTS
The Legitimacy of Economic Coercion:
The Carter Foreign Aid Policy and
Nicaragua
I. INTRODUCTION
Between 1974-1979, various reports surfaced alleging human
rights violations in Nicaragua. An increasingly pervasive tension
arose between the Somoza government and opposition groups, cul-
minating in civil war and the fall of the Somoza regime in July 1979.
Neither the United Nations (UN) nor the Organization of American
States (OAS) took any action until late in 1978, when the OAS sent
a three-nation mission to help negotiate a settlement between
Somoza and the opposition forces.' Despite the reluctance of these
international organizations to take any specific action with regard to
the alleged human rights violations, the United States unilaterally
asserted and implemented a policy of economic coercion designed
to "remedy" the human rights "situation." In the spring of 1977, the
United States began the withdrawal of foreign assistance to Nicara-
gua, a policy which was to continue in effect until the alleged "situa-
tion" was cured.
2
The withdrawal of United States foreign assistance to Nicara-
gua, on human rights grounds, raises three major issues with regard
to the legitimacy of economic coercion under international law:
(1) whether such coercion constitutes intervention; (2) whether such
coercion constitutes a prohibited use of force; and (3) whether and
under what circumstances human rights considerations are a suffi-
1. On September 23, 1978, the OAS passed a resolution urging member nations to
refrain from any action which might aggravate the Nicaragua situation. At the same time,
the OAS sponsored a three-nation mission to help negotiate a peaceful settlement between
Somoza and the opposition. See DEP'T ST. BULL. 56 (Aug. 1979) (statement of Ambassador
McGee).
The United Nations' sole action was the passing of a resolution urging Nicaraguan
authorities to ensure respect for the human rights of Nicaraguan citizen, G.A. Res. 33/76, 9
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 58-59 (1978), approved December 15, 1978.
2. Congress released a $75,000,000 aid package on September 12, 1980. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 13, 1980, at 2, col. 1.
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cient legal justification for intervention. In light of the current status
of human rights policies in international relations, and particularly
the human rights achievements prerequisite to certification for U.S.
foreign assistance, these issues may be of critical importance to pres-
ent and future administrations. After presenting necessary back-
ground information, this comment examines the issues in view of
customary international law and applicable international treaties
and conventions, and attempts to draw certain conclusions about the
legality of the United States' action in this specific instance.
II. THE FACTUAL CONTEXT
A. The Situation in Nicaragua and the Historical Context of the
United States-Nicaragua Relationship
During the first third of this century, the United States was
deeply involved in the major political, economic and military events
taking place in Nicaragua.3 This relationship was evidenced by eco-
nomic aid and substantial military intervention, including creation
of the Nicaraguan National Guard.4 The Somoza family came to
power during this period with U.S. support,5 and continued to dom-
inate Nicaraguan politics until the fall of President Anastasio
Somoza in July of 1979.
In 1971, Somoza. entered into an agreement with the Nicara-
guan Conservative Party concerning the drafting of a new constitu-
tion, which was to upgrade Conservative representation in the
national legislature from thirty-three percent to a minimum of forty
percent.6 Somoza relinquished power as President and was suc-
ceeded by a three-man National Junta. 7 A constitutional conven-
tion drafted the new constitution, effective April 3, 1974,8 which
3. Tierney, Revolutions and the Marines: The United States and Nicaragua in the Early
Years, in AN ALLY UNDER SIEGE 9 (B. Bell ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Eary Years].
4. Id at 15; Rethinking United States Foreign Policy Toward the Developing World-
Nicaragua Hearings Before the Subcomna on International Development of the House
Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. Part I, at 6 (1977) (statement of
Richard L. Millett) [hereinafter cited as Rethinking].
5. Early Years, supra note 3, at 18, 20.
6. Bell Legalities and Political Realities, in AN ALLY UNDER SIEGE 43 (B. Bell ed.
1977) [hereinafter cited as Legalities].
7. Id
8. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RiGHTs: NICARAGUA, Doc. 16, rev. 1 at 27
n.4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as OAS REPORT].
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provided for a presidential election that year.9 Somoza defeated the
Conservative leader with over ninety percent of the vote o and was
reinaugurated December 1, 1974.1
On December 27, 1974, the Sandinista National Liberation
Front (FSLN) terrorists attacked a reception for United States Am-
bassador Turner B. Shelton, murdering four persons and holding
forty-one guests hostage for sixty hours.' 2 Two days later, Somoza
declared a State of Siege, suspending all constitutional rights.' 3
Martial law prevailed until September 19, 1977.14
The United States remained supportive of Nicaragua and the
Somoza administration until 1977. This support involved economic
aid totalling almost $78,000,00015 and military assistance, including
direct training of the National Guard.16
Between December 1974 and September 1977, reports emerged
of human rights violations in Nicaragua.' 7 These reports led to a
worldwide press campaign, two separate hearings in the United
States House of Representatives, and subsequent investigation by
the OAS Human Rights Commission.' The reports were conffict-
9. Legalities, supra note 6, at 48.
10. Id at 43.
11. Id at44.
12. Id at 57.
13. OAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 29.
14. Id at 29. For a detailed discussion of the martial law, see id at 28-29.
Note, however, that Article 197 of the Nicaraguan Constitution provides: "[i]n no case
shall the decree of suspension of restriction [of constitutional rights] affect the following
guarantees:
a) The inviolability of human life;
b) The prohibitions of trials by judges other than those designated by law;
c) The prohibition against acts of cruelty of torture and infamous punish-
ment;
d) The prohibition against retroactive or confiscatory laws;
e) The prohibitions against imposing taxes ..
Id at 27.
15. Senator Curtis, Economic Aid to Nicaragua.- Should It Be Continued, in AN ALLY
UNDER SIEGE 140 (B. Bell ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Economic Aid].
16. Rethinking, supra note 4, at 6. Military aid included the training of Nicaraguan
officers and enlisted men at United States service schools. Id at 6. For a discussion of the
differing perspectives on the nature of military aid to Nicaragua, see Sigmund & Speck,
Virtues Reward The United States and Somoza 1973-1978, reprinted in Major Trends and
Issues in the United States Relations with the Nations of Latin America" Hearings Before the
Subcomm on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Senate Comm on Foreign Affairs, 95th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 204 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Virtues Reward].
17. These "reports" appeared primarily in the media. The source of all such reports
appears to have been a handful of Capuchin priests. See infra note 20.
18. See Human Rights in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador.- Implicationsfor U.S,
Policy Hearings Before the Sucomm. on International Organizations of the House Comm. on
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ing,' 9 and several "sources" were clearly impeachable. 20
In April 1977, ostensibly on human rights grounds, the Carter
Administration announced that it was withholding $20,000,000 in
economic aid and refusing to sign new security assistance pacts with
Nicaragua. 21 Throughout the spring and summer of 1977, Congress
debated cutting all Nicaraguan military aid from the 1978 fiscal year
appropriations,22 and the State Department began pressuring
Somoza with regard to the "human rights" condition.23
Somoza lifted the State of Siege on September 19, 1977.24 The
State Department decided to sign the military security agreement
International Relations, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Hearings];
Human Rights in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Implications for US. Policy."
Hearings Before the Subcomm on International Organizations of the House Comm on Inter-
national Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Hearings]; OAS
REPORT, supra note 8.
19. See, e.g., 123 CONG. Rc. 20, 187 (1977) (statement of Rep. Murphy); 125 CONG.
REc. E594 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1979) (statement of Rep. Hansen); St. John, Human Rights and
Revolution, A Case Study In Moral Confusion, in AN ALLY UNDER SIEGE (B. Bell ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Moral Confusion].
20. Congressman Murphy maintained that the 1976 Hearings were rigged-that hos-
tile witnesses were arranged by the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) and that
the witnesses were coached on the form and substance of their testimony by William Brown.
Moral Confusion, supra note 19, at 70.
The only witness from Nicaragua to appear before the subcommittee was Jesuit Father
Fernando Cardenal, whose politics were clearly suspect and whose testimony contained 12
specific errors of fact according to the State Department. Id at 70-72. When the United
States Embassy in Managua sought to substantiate Cardenal's claims of human rights viola-
tions, Dr. Pedro Chamoro (opposition leader and publisher of La Prensa) told Embassy
officials that he could neither confirm nor endorse many of Cardenal's allegations. Id Even
Cardenal admitted that he had no personal knowledge of the violations he cited. Id at 73.
The single source of all allegations of Nicaraguan human rights violations, leading to
the press reports, United States hearings, OAS and Amnesty International reports, was a
handful of Capuchin missionaries. Id The Capuchins admittedly thought that a Commu-
nist regime would be preferable in Nicaragua and advocated the withdrawal of United
States aid for this reason. Id at 73-77. Furthermore, the allegations of "violent" human
rights violations resulted almost exclusively from clashes between Nicaraguan national
guard and FSLN terrorists. Id at 73.
Throughout the period of martial law, there remained freedom of religion, passage,
press, political opposition, etc. Id
21. L.A. Times, Apr. 6, 1978, § 1 at 6, col. 1 (statement of Charles Bray III).
22. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1980: Hearings Before
a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. Part 7, at 64-65 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Appropriations Hearings]. Rep. Koch
offered an amendment, cutting military aid to Nicaragua, which passed 5-4. Id On June
14, Rep. Cedenberg offered an amendment to the full appropriations committee to restore
military aid, which passed 225-180. Id
23. See Rethinking, supra note 4, Part II at 2-8 & 7-9.
24. 1980 Appropriations Hearings, supra note 22, at 65.
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for 1977,25 but deferred payment of $12,000,000 in economic aid for
the rural poor indefinitely "pending evidence of long-range im-
provement in the human rights policies of Nicaraguan President
Anastasio Somoza."
26
A State Department report referred to marked improvements in
Nicaragua's human rights record in February of 1978.27 In early
May, the State Department decided to release the $12,000,000 eco-
nomic aid package.28 In June, Somoza agreed to accept a visit by
the OAS Human Rights Commission. 29 After these signs of im-
provement, the United States signed the loans for the $12,000,000 in
economic aid-but the loans were never in fact dispersed.
30
On August 23, 1978, FSLN terrorists attacked the National Pal-
ace.3' Constitutional rights were temporarily suspended on Septem-
ber 13,32 and on October 12, Somoza decided that certain rights
would remain suspended for six months.3 3 In late September 1978,
the OAS, in accordance with a U.S. proposal, sent a three-nation
mission to Nicaragua to mediate between Somoza and the opposi-
25. Id
26. Id at 65-66.
27. Id
28. Id
29. Id
30. Id
31. Id
32. OAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 25.
33. Id at 25-26. The constitutional rights suspended were those stipulated in Articles
39, 40, 41, 42, 46, 49, 58, 59, 73, and 75:
Article 39: Guarantees individual liberty; Article 40: states that arrests can
only be carried out upon the written order of a competent official; Article 41: guar-
antees that a person arrested be released or delivered to the competent judge within
24 hours after detention; Article 42: deals with the right to habeas corpus; Article
46: states that any detention for investigation must be revoked or converted into
imprisonment within ten days of being placed at the disposal of the competent
judicial authorities, and minors must be sent to special rehabilitation institutions;
Article 49: states that no court shall handle cases outside its jurisdiction (fuero
attractivo); that no case shall be removed from the appropriate judge nor brought
before a special court, except under a previous law; Article 58: guarantees the
inviolability of the home and of any other private place; Article 59: recognizes
personal freedom to travel throughout the country and to choose a place of resi-
dence within it; Article 73: guarantees the right to meet in the open and to demon-
strate publicly; Article 75: establishes the right of every person to address written
petitions or claims to public authorities and the obligation of those authorities to
act on them and make known the result. Id
Article 2 of the Martial Law states that the President of the Republic himself
or through civilian or military authorities can execute all dispositions of law, dur-
ing periods of suspension or restrictions of constitutional rights.
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tion forces.34 The OAS also passed a resolution urging member
governments to refrain from taking any action which might aggra-
vate the "situation" in Nicaragua. 35
The U.S. and the OAS triumvirate consistently called for the
resignation of Somoza and replacement of his regime by a broadly-
based transition government. 36 This was to be followed by a negoti-
ated cease-fire, new democratic elections, and subsequent economic
aid.37 Although Somoza made some concessions, including rescis-
sion of the October decree and reinstatement of constitutional law in
December 1978,38 the U.S. terminated all military assistance pro-
grams and withdrew all military aid early in 1979. 39 Simultane-
ously, the Carter Administration terminated aid funding on all
projects in an early stage of development, stating that the 1977 eco-
nomic loans would not be dispersed and that no further economic
aid would be forthcoming.4°
The Somoza regime fell to the Sandinista insurrectionists on
July 17, 1979, upon Somoza's resignation.41
B. The Carter Human Rights Policy-Groundsfor the Withdrawal
of Aid
Three grounds appear to be the basis for the withholding of aid
from Nicaragua by the Carter Administration:42 that AID funds
had been "misappropriated" and converted to the Somoza family's
personal use;43 that Nicaragua was not sufficiently democratic; and
that Nicaragua had engaged in consistent violations of human
rights.
There is significant overlap between the second and third
34. DEP'T ST. BULL., supra note 1, at 55.
35. Id at 55, 59.
36. DEP'T ST. BULL. (Nov. 1979).
37. Id at 57.
38. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1978, at 1, col. I.
39. Western Hemisphere: Nicaragua, DEP'T ST. BULL. 66 (May 1979).
40. Id The United States cited the unwillingness of the Somoza government to accept
the proposals of the OAS triumvirate, the resulting prospects for renewed violence and po-
larization, and the human rights situation as primary considerations in the determination to
withdraw all aid. Id
41. DEP'T ST. BULL., supra note 1, at 60.
42. This is to be concluded from various congressional debates, reports, statements of
State Department, etc.
43. The allegations of conversion [see, e.g., Rethinking, supra note 4, Part I, at 5 (state-
ments of Richard L. Millett)] were refuted by both the United States Embassy in Managua
and AID in a 1976 statement. Economic Aid, supra note 15, at 141.
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"grounds," in part because of the ambiguity and broadness of the
Carter human rights policies. UN Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick
described this overlap in a 1980 article:
Carter's human rights were not defined in terms of personal and
legal rights-freedom from torture, arbitrary imprisonment and
arrest [crimes against human dignity] as in the usage of Amnesty
International and the United States Foreign Assistance Acts of
1961 and 1975-but in accordance with a much broader concept
which included the political "rights" available only in democra-
cies, and the economic "rights" promised by socialism (shelter,
food, health, education). It may be that no country in the world
meets these standards; certainly no Third World country does.
The very broadness of the definition invited an arbitrary and ca-
pricious policy of implementation."
The statements of the Carter Administration and Congress re-
ferred frequently to democratic rights and principles, the absence of
democratic rule in Nicaragua, and the achievement of a democratic
solution in Nicaragua and other Latin American countries. 45 It is
apparent that the absence of a "democratic" government, as defined
by the United States, was critical to the United States' withdrawal of
aid. The foreign aid instrument was used by the Carter Administra-
tion in an attempt to force change in the structure of Nicaraguan
politics," and it also seems clear that the changes sought would
have resulted in a climate more favorable to the United States'
interests.47
Several important issues arise with regard to the United States'
use of the economic instrument. These include whether the "with-
holding of the carrot" constituted unilateral intervention into the
domestic affairs of Nicaragua; whether the use of economic coercion
constituted a proscribed use of force; and whether the United States'
44. Kirkpatrick, U.S. Security & Latin America, 71 COMMENTARY 29, 32-33 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Kirkpatrick]. See also Report of the Secretary of State Regarding the
Operations and Mandate of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Jan.
31, 1978), reprinted in Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1979, Hearings Before the
Subcomm on International Relations, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. Part 4, Appendix I at 531-33.
45. See, e.g., 1976 Hearings, supra note 18, at 3 (statement of Rep. Murphy); 123
CONG. REC. 27447 (1977) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); DEP'T ST. BULL., supra note 1, at 58-
59; 123 CONG. REc. 39363 (exhibit 5) (1977). See generally Kirkpatrick, supra note 44, at 32-
39.
46. Virtues Reward, supra note 16, at 213 (citing U.S. DEPT OF DEFENSE, SECURITY
SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION FISCAL YEAR 1979 (Washington,
D.C. 1978)).
47. Id See also DEP'T ST. BULL. 14 (Nov. 1979).
19821
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failure to delineate between human rights goals and democratic
principles precludes any claim to a right of humanitarian
intervention.
III. DID THE UNITED STATES'S WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN AID
CONSTITUTE INTERVENTION?
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) lists the generally-recognized sources of international law the
ICJ is required to apply:48
(a) International conventions, whether general or particu-
lar, establishing rules expressly recognized by the consenting
states;
(b) International custom, as evidenced of a general practice
accepted as law;
(c) The general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations;
(d) [Subject to the provisions of Article 59] judicial deci-
sions and teachings of the most-qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for determination of the rules of
law.
International custom, mentioned in subsection (b) of Article 38,
refers to a "usage felt by those who follow it to be an obligatory
one." 49 Evidence that a customary law exists is found primarily
through an analysis of the practice of states over time.50 If states
generally adhere to a single course of interaction, out of a sense of
legal duty, the emerging mode of conduct attains the status of a
principle of customary international law.51
Customary law may be overridden by certain treaty or conven-
48. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 49 Stat. 1031, TS No.
993.
49. J. BIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 59 (6th ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as BRIERLY].
50. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (2d ed. 1973) [herein-
after cited as BROWNLIE].
51. Id There is a presumption in favor of sovereign power. The burden of proof is on
the state alleging that the act of another state has violated international law. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice addressed the notion of putative rule customary international law in
the Asylum Case (Colum. v. Peru), (1950) 150 I.C.J. 266, 276:
The Party which relies on a custom [sic] must prove that this custom is estab-
lished in such a manner that it has become binding on the other Party. The Co-
lumbia Government must prove that the rule invoked by it is in accordance with a
constant and uniform usage practiced by the States in question, and that this usage
is the expression of a right appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty
incumbent on the territorial State.
[Vol. 5
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tion provisions.52 Two treaties are pertinent in analyzing the legal-
ity of the United States' actions in Nicaragua: the Charter of the
United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of the Ameri-
can States.
A. Customary International Law
Brownlie tells us that "[Tihe objectives of [foreign] aid must be
lawful" and it should not be "given [or taken away] under condi-
tions which lead to infringement of principles of the sovereign
equality of states. ' 53 The principle of sovereignty is an irrefutable
example of customary international law. The principal corollaries
of the sovereignty and equality of states are:
(1) a jurisdiction prima facie exclusive, over a territory and
the permanent population living there;
(2) a duty of non-intervention in the area of exclusive juris-
diction of other states; and
(3) the dependence of obligations arising from customary
law and treaties on the consent of the obligor.
54
The duty of non-intervention complements and guarantees the
principle of sovereignty. When applicable, this duty prohibits inter-
ference by one state with the affairs of another, which impairs the
independence of the latter state.55 Not all degrees of interference
constitute a prohibited intervention; persuasion by states to accom-
modate conflicting interest is the essence of art of international rela-
tions. However, when persuasion amounts to forced interference
into the affairs of a sovereign state, without consent, for the pur-
poses of constraining the sovereign will of that state, permissible
persuasion becomes impermissible intervention. 56 Lauterpacht de-
fines traditional intervention a bit more forcefully as "dictatorial in-
terference in the sense of action amounting to a denial of the
independence of a State. . . implying a preemptory demand of pos-
itive conduct or abstention-a demand which, if not complied with,
involves a threat or recourse to compulsion in some form.
'57
52. See BRIERLY, supra note 49, at 402.
53. BROWNLIE, supra note 50, at 253-54.
54. Id at 280.
55. BRIERLY, supra note 49, at 402.
56. See A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, NON-INTERVENrION 71-72 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS].
57. Lauterpacht, Intervention and Human Rights, RECUIEL DES COURS LII at 19 (1947-
1982]
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The first issue thus becomes whether the degree of "persuasion"
or action used by the United States in Nicaragua amounted to a
forced intervention into the internal affairs of that state. It should
be noted that in many cases, there appears to be an overlap between
the concept of prohibited force and the concept of intervention.
There are several general principles and customs of international
law which may be applied to cases of economic concern.
1. Method and Degree of Coercive Measures
as a Determinator
Some commentators argue that the degree and/or manner in
which economic pressure is applied should be considered in deter-
mining whether a state's actions constitute a "forced interference"
with the affairs of another state.58 While there is little "law" specifi-
cally referring to economic coercion, the argument or principle is
somewhat analogous to the Law of the Sea.59 The emerging law
governing fisheries requires that if a coastal state seeks to withdraw
fishing rights from another country, it must do so over a reasonable
period of time.6°
In the instant case, the United States' withdrawal of aid was
clearly abrupt and without prior notice, with devastating results. A
conclusion might therefore be drawn that the United States' actions
did constitute a "forced interference" in Nicaraguan affairs.
2. United Nations Declarations and Resolutions
United Nations declarations and resolutions represent at a min-
imum a consensus of world expectation, and therefore may reflect
customary law and universally-accepted principles. 6' Two United
Nations resolutions are pertinent: the Declaration on the Inadmissi-
bility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and Protec-
tion of their Independence and Sovereignty, 62 and the Declaration
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation Among States in accordance with the Charter of
58. See, e.g., Parry, Defning Economic Coercion in International Law, 12 TEx. INT'L L.
J. 1, 4 (1977).
59. Id
60. Id
61. See BROWNLIE, supra note 50, at 14.
62. G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Declaration on Inadmissibility).
[Vol. 5
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the United Nations.63
The Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention provides
in Paragraph 1:
No state has the right to intervene directly or indirectly/or any rea-
son whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state.
Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interfer-
ence or attempted threats against the personality of the State or
against its political, economic and cultural elements are
condemned. 64
Paragraph 2 states that "[n]o State may use or encourage the
use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce
another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the
exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from its advantage of any
kind." 65
Together, these paragraphs indicate a general consensus by
states of a proscription against any intervention, either direct or in-
direct into the affairs of a state such as Nicaragua, or any interfer-
ence with that state's political or economic elements.66 Any exercise
of economic coercion, whatever the form, directed towards ob-
taining the subordination of the state's sovereign rights, including its
choice of political structure, appears to be proscribed also.
The Declaration on Principles of International Law contains
similar provisions:
No state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or
any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to
obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign
rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind.67
Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural systems without interference in any
form by another State.6
8
The UN declarations do not define economic coercion or force
63. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Declaration on Principles].
64. Declaration on Inadmissibility, supra note 62, at 12 (Emphasis added).
65. Id
66. The author recognizes that in any discussion of foreign aid as intervention, there
exists a counter-argument, i.e., that under the principle of sovereignty each state has the
right to manage its economy as it deems best, including the right to both grant and revoke
aid in such a manner as would maximize the national interest.
67. Declaration on Principles, supra note 63, at 123.
68. Id
1982]
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in relative terms. The declarations proscribe any form of interfer-
ence and any form of economic coercion, regardless of degree,
where used to subordinate the exercise of. sovereign rights (such as
the choice of government). This is particularly true where the inter-
fering state will derive some benefit from its actions.
The United States admittedly directed the use of economic
pressure toward achievement of some change in Nicaragua's polit-
ical structure. 69 This would be to the benefit of United States' inter-
ests in the region. The United States' actions might well be in
violation of non-intervention and non-force principles of interna-
tional law.
B. International Conventions and Treaties
1. The United Nations Charter
The United Nations Charter is the foremost example of inter-
national treaty law.70 To the extent that the Charter proscribes con-
duct previously governed by customary law, the latter is
preempted.7'
The UN Charter proscribes use of force as a unilateral action
by any state or group of states when it constitutes a threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression identified in Article
39.72 Therefore, it must be determined whether economic coercion
constitutes force under Article 2(4), and if so, whether it constitutes
permissible action under the attendant circumstances.
a. Article 2(4)
Article 2(4) of the Charter provides that "[A]IU Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.' 73 If force is used inconsistently with the Charter's
69. See, e.g., 123 CoNG. REc. 39363-64 (exhibit 5) (1977); 125 CONG. REc. S8404-05
(daily ed. June 25, 1979) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); 125 CONG. REc. H7379-80 (daily ed.
Sept. 6, 1979) (statement of Sen. Baumann).
70. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited
as OPPENHEIM].
71. Ciobanu, Impact of the Characteristics of the Charter Upon Its Interpretation, in
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-9 (A. Cassesse ed. 1975).
72. Boorman III, Economic Coercion in International Law. The Arab Oil Weapon and
the Ensuing Juridical Issues, 9 J. INT'L LAW & ECON. 205, 219 (1974).
73. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
[Vol. 5
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stated purposes against territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence, it isprimafacie prohibited as intervention into the domestic
affairs of the state.
Extensive discussions have produced little agreement regarding
the kind of force proscribed by Article 2(4). One view is that
"force" is limited to armed force and does not include political and
economic pressure. Support for this position dates from the 1945
San Francisco Conference where a motion by Brazil to amend the
article to read "from the threat or use of force" and from the threat
or use of "economic measures" was rejected in favor of the present
language. 74 However, United States delegates, among others,
pointed out that the phrase "in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations" was designed to insure against
any loopholes. 75 Thus, the possibility that economic coercion is ile-
gitimate is at least arguable.
Given the general principle that no section of the Charter
should be read "in a vacuum," 76 proponents of a more restricted
reading of Article 2(4) claim that the nexus between Article 2(4) and
Articles 39 and 51 must be examined.77 The Security Council's mo-
nopoly over the use of force established by articles 39 and 42 helps
to explain prohibition of force in Article 2(4), and it is argued that
the terms "threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression"
in Article 39 constitute a disposition of that force.78 Since the ma-
jority interprets Article 39 as excluding the use of economic and
political pressure, it is argued that force must be interpreted only as
an armed attack.79
A final and major argument against a broad reading of force
under Article 2(4) is that the broader interpretation would lead to
practical difficulties in distinguishing between permissible and im-
permissible economic or political pressures.80
74. See Doc. 784, I/1/27, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. VI 331, 334-335 (1945). The Brazilian
Amendment was rejected by a 26-2 vote. Id at 335.
75. Brosche, The Arab Oil Embargo and United States Pressure Against Chile.: Eco-
nomic and Political Coercion and the Charter ofthe United Nations, CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
3, 22-23 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brosche].
76. Id at 18; GOODRICH, HAMBRO & SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 45
(3rd ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as GOODRICH].
77. Brosche, supra note 75, at 21-22.
78. Id at 22.
79. Id
80. GOODRICH, supra note 76, at 48. In response to this problem, at least one theorist
has suggested characterizing of economic measures as unlawful by their intent. See Bowett,
Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1972).
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Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of a broad interpreta-
tion of Article 2(4) is to be found in the language of the provisions
itself. While aware of the diverse methods by which one modem
nation can coerce another, the framers neither embellished nor
modified the word "force" with any adjectives which might have the
effect of limiting its scope.8' In other areas of the Charter, where the
framers meant to limit the use of force to armed force, they specifi-
cally did so. 82 Furthermore, the Charter has a constitutional charac-
ter,83 and it is an axiom of constitutional drafting that the
instrument be imbued with enough flexibility and expansiveness to
ensure against obsolescence. s4 This was the rationale for leaving
Article 2(4) open-ended.
Whether or not Article 2(4) was intended to include coercion as
force at the time of its drafting, it is clear that the United Nations
and its Charter are not intended to exist in a vacuum. The evolution
of international relations may therefore compel inclusion of eco-
nomic coercion within the meaning of Article 2(4). Insofar as the
UN purports to embody world opinion, it cannot easily ignore con-
cern with respect to measures "necessary" to insure peace. 85 Extra-
neous sources offering evidence of a world consensus regarding the
illegitimacy of economic coercion must be considered. 86 Examples
of such evidence include the UN Declaration on the Inadmissibility
of Intervention,87 the UN Declaration on Principles of International
Law,88 the Soviet Draft Definition of Agression,8 9 the Charter of
81. Comment, The Use of Nonviolent Coercion" A Study in Legality Under Article 2(4)
of the Charter of the United Nations, 122 U. PA. L. Rav. 983, 997 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Use of Nonviolent Coercion].
82. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER preamble, art. 43, art. 46 & art. 51.
83. Use of Nonviolent Coercion, supra note 81, at 999.
84. Id
85. Id
86. Id; Brosche, supra note 75, at 18.
87. Declaration on Inadmissibility, supra note 62.
88. Declaration on Principles, supra note 63.
89. U.N. Doc. A/A066/L. 2/Rev. 1 (1953). The text of the Soviet draft is contained in
Special Comm. on the Question of Defining Aggression, 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 11),
U.N. Doc. A/2638, at 13-14 (1953). Subdivision 3 of the U.S.S.R. Draft Resolution reads in
part:
That State shall be declared to have committed an act of economic aggression
which first commits one of the following acts;
(a) Takes against another State measures of economic pressure violating its
sovereignty and economic independence and threatening the bases of its eco-
nomic life ....
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Economic Rights and Duties of States,9° and the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties.9
It is thus arguable that measures of economic coercion such as
those taken by the United States vis-A-vis Nicaragua fall within the
province of Article 2(4) force.
b. Article 2(7)
The Article 2(7) proscription of UN intervention into the do-
mestic affairs of states92 is another standard by which to evaluate the
United States' actions. The predominant view is that unilateral acts
of states should be judged at a minimum by the standards required
of the UN.
93
There has been considerable discussion as to what constitutes
intervention.94  One view defines Article 2(7) intervention in the
same terms as intervention was defined under customary law:
[A] technical term of, on the whole, unequivocal connotation. It
signifies dictatorial interference in the sense of action amounting
to denial of the independence of a state. It implies apreemptory
demandfor positive conduct or abstention-a demand which, !f not
complied with, involves a threat of or recourse to compulsion in
someform.95
An alternative view is that intervention should not be inter-
preted in a narrow technical sense, but rather in the sense under-
90. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974),
reprinted in 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 484, 493 (1975). Article 32 provides:
No state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of
measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the
exercise of its sovereign rights.
91. Declaration on the Prohibition of Military, Political or Economic Coercion in the
Conclusion of Treaties: Final Act, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/26 [1968], reprinted in S.
ROSENNE, THE LAw OF TREATIES 432 (1970).
1. Solemnly condemns the threat or use of pressure in any form, whether military,
political, or economic, by any State in order to coerce another State to perform any
act relating to the conclusion of a treaty in violation of the principles of the sover-
eign equality of States and freedom of consent; ....
92. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 provides "nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any State .... "
93. Fonteyne, Forcible Se/-Help by States to Protect Human Rights: Recent Viewsfrom
the United Nations, in HUMANiTARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 205 (R.
Lillich ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION].
94. Id
95. Lauterpacht, The International Protection of Human Rights, RECUEIL DES COURS,
LII at 19 (1947-1), cited in GOODRICH, supra note 76, at 67 (Emphasis added).
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stood by the layman to mean interference in any form. 96
While the UN organs have never signified a definite preference,
it is apparent that the nature of the United States' actions would fall
within either definition of Article 2(7) intervention. The United
States conditioned the release of aid funds and the reinstitution of
aid programs upon positive conduct and/or abstention by the Nica-
raguan government-a demand which involved a threat and re-
course to compulsion in the form of a withdrawal of aid greatly
needed by that country.
c. Article 2(3)
Article 2(3) provides that "all members shall settle their inter-
national disputes by peaceful means, in such a manner that interna-
tional peace and security, and justice are not endangered." Article
2(3) is the logical corollary of Article 2(7). Article 2(3) by its terms
refers only to "disputes," not to "situations." The Permanent Court
of International Justice has defined "dispute" as "a disagreement on
a point of law or fact, a conffict of legal views between two persons.
This takes the form of claims which are met with refusals, counter-
claims, denials, countercharges, accusations, etc."' 97 A situation is a
condition which, although undesirable, has not yet become a dis-
pute-an unhealthy condition that could eventually degenerate into
a confrontation amounting to a dispute. 98
The Charter expresses no standards for state action with respect
to a "situation." However, it seems clear that peaceful settlement as
proscribed in Article 2(3) would be the minimum standard consis-
tent with Charter goals. Although Article 2(3) fails to delineate
"peaceful methods of settlement," Article 33(1) provides that "par-
ties to a dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security, shall first of all
seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, ar-
bitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrange-
ments, or other peaceful means of their choice." Conspicuously
absent from this list is the use of economic or political pressure.
In the case of the United States' withdrawal of aid from Nica-
96. GOODRICH, supra note 76, at 67.
97. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 2, at 11, quoted in
Brosche, supra note 75, at 31.
98. Friedman, US Trade Sanctions Against Uganda- Legality Under International
Law, 11 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 1149, 1176 (1979). "Situations" are referred to in
articles 1(1), 11(3), 12, 14, 34, 35(1) and 36(1) of the UN CHARTER.
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ragua, it is unclear whether a "dispute" existed, or merely a "situa-
tion." Arguably, the issue as a point of law was whether Nicaragua
had violated human rights. If so, the "dispute standard" would ap-
ply. In either event, the United States' failure to employ peaceful
means of settlement violated the standards proscribed in Article
2(3).
2. The OAS Charter
Both the United States and Nicaragua are contracting parties to
the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS
Charter).99
a. Articles 15 and 16
Article 15 provides:
No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever in the internal or external af-
fairs of any other state. The foregoing principle prohibits not
only armed force, but also any other form of interference or at-
tempted threat against the personality of the state or its political,
economic and cultural elements.'1o
The prohibition of intervention by the OAS Charter is broad.
It includes any action which places another state in the position of
choosing submission or the harsh consequences of refusal.'°' Broad
freedom from intervention is thus accepted as a principle of inter-
American law. Any compulsion exerted from state to state consti-
tutes a violation.'0 2
Lest there be any doubt that economic or political coercion lies
within the gambit of the Article 15 proscription, Article 16 provides
that "[n]o state may use or encourage the use of coercive measures
of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign
will of another state and obtain from its advantage of any kind."
The message is clear: under the OAS Charter, no economic
coercion may be applied against a member state to compel subordi-
99. 0. STOETZER, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 3, 195 (1965).
100. Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
T.I.A.S. No. 2361; as amended Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847 [hereinafter
cited as OAS Charter].
101. A. THOMAs & A. THOMAS, supra note 56, at 160-61.
102. Id
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nation of its sovereign rights.103 The United States' actions were in
violation of the OAS Charter.
b. Articles 5(g) and 21
Article 5(g) affirms as a principle of American international law
that "controversies of an international character arising between
two or more American States shall be settled by peaceful proce-
dures." Article 21 defines these peaceful procedures as "direct nego-
tiation, good offices, mediation, investigation and conciliation,
judicial settlement, arbitration and those upon which the parties to
the dispute may especially agree upon at the time."
While the OAS Charter, like the UN Charter, makes no specific
reference to the standard for action with regard to a situation, the
minimum standard consistent with the Charter would be settlement
by peaceful procedures. Determination of whether a dispute or a
situation existed is therefore unnecessary. In either event, economic
coercion would be outside the scope of proscribed action under
these Charter provisions.
c. OAS Resolutions
While the binding nature of resolutions or declarations has
been open to controversy, there is a strong body of authoritative
opinion which holds Conference resolutions and declarations to be
juridical and to have obligatory force upon signatory nations.' °4 It is
appropriate, therefore, to consider the OAS Council's resolutions of
September 1972105 and June 1979106 which called on member states
to abstain from any action which might aggravate the situation. 0 7
103. OAS CHARTER, supra note 100, at art. 15.
The modifying phrase "and obtain from it advantages of any kind" limits the scope of
the provision. However, under the present facts, it seems probable that any resulting change
would be to the United States' security interests in the region.
104. A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, supra note 56, at 67-68. The Thomas' refer to Fen-
wick's conclusion that inter-American Conference resolutions and declarations as sources of
international law are legally binding.
The Thomas' also cited United States Secretary of State Hughes who stated that certain
resolutions which are of a character not requiring sanction in the form of a treaty are
deemed to be binding upon the powers according to the tenor adopted by the specific confer-
ence. Id at 68.
105. The United States was the proponent of the Resolution referred to by Ambassa-
dor McGee in his statement which is reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., supra note 1, at 55. The
text of the resolution may also be found at OEA/Ser F/I 17; Doc. 40/79, rev. 2.
106. Id
107. Id at 58.
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While the tenor of the resolution seems not to make it legally bind-
ing, the resolution would seem, at a minimum, to reinforce policies
of Articles 15 and 16. The United States' economic coercion subse-
quent to these resolutions is therefore strongly suspect. If the resolu-
tions are binding, the United States' actions would be violations
thereof.
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
One might argue that the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)os is applicable by analogy to the U.S.-Nicaraguan
situation. GATT generally prohibits economic coercion. A major
goal of GATT is the prevention of economic and trade warfare, by a
substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers, and the
elimination of discrimnation in international commerce. 0 9 Since
the United States and Nicaragua are both parties to GATT, its pol-
icy of reasonable economic conduct is inconsistent with discrimina-
tory economic treatment of Nicaragua.
C Conclusions
The United States' withdrawal of aid from Nicaragua in an at-
tempt to force Somoza to resign,I1o forces a "democratic" solution to
the Nicaraguan "problem,"" ' l and creates an overall change in the
Nicaraguan human rights environment 12 seems clearly violative of
international law. Analysis of both customary and treaty law indi-
cates that United States' actions constituted proscribed intervention
and use of force, contradicting the mandate of the modern law of
nations.
The question thus arises whether the attenuating human rights
circumstances might serve to legitimize the otherwise "illegal" acts.
IV. WAS THERE A LEGITIMIZING FACTOR?-THE DOCTRINE OF
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Under customary international law, an act of intervention had
108. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. (5) A3 & (6), A1365, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
109. See Jackson, Foreign Aid" Strategy of Stopgap, 41 FOREIGN AFF. 90 (1962).
110. The statements of Mr. Christopher and Mr. Vaky in DEP'T ST. BULL., supra note
I at 58-60, typify the United States's position throughout the latter part of the period at
issue.
111. Id
112. Id
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to be justified as a legitimate case of reprisal," 3 protection of nation-
als abroad," 4 or alternatively as authorized by special treaty with
the state concerned.' 5 None of these justifications existed when the
United States proclaimed its new policy, and withdrew aid from
Nicaragua. The United States asserted that human rights violations
were the primary basis for the withdrawal of aid. An examination
of international law governing humanitarian intervention is there-
fore appropriate.
A. The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention Defined
A general rule of customary international law provides that "by
virtue of its personal and territorial supremacy, a State can treat its
own nationals according to its discretion."" 6 This is part of the
broader principle of non-intervention.
While historically there has been no unanimity on the point,
there appears to be a possible exception to the general rule: the doc-
trine of humanitarian intervention. Lauterpacht tells us that:
[T]here is a substantial body of opinion and practice in support of
the view that there are limits to that discretion [of states in the
treatment of their nationals] and that when a State renders itself
guilty of cruelties against and persecution of its nationals, in a
way as to deny their fundamental rights and to shock the con-
science of mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity is
legally permissible."1
7
However, even Lauterpacht conceded that the doctrine of hu-
manitarian intervention had "never become a fully acknowledged
part of positive international law."" 8 Indeed, historically, several
scholars felt that the doctrine was not within the "code of interna-
tional law" and further believed that it should not be so included, in
light of the fact that the doctrine would be "manifestly open to
abuses, tending to violation and destruction of the vital principles of
113. BRIERLY, supra note 49, at 402.
Reprisal refers to the institutions of seizing property or persons by way of retaliation for
a wrong previously done to the State taking reprisals. Id at 399.
114. Id at 402.
115. Id The Treaty of Havana of 1903, for example, gave the United States the right
to intervene in Cuba for the preservation of its independence, the maintenance of a govern-
ment adequate for the protection of life, property and liability, etc. It was abrogated in 1934.
116. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 279 (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1948).
117. OPPENHEIM, supra note 70, at 137.
118. BRIERLY, supra note 49, at 403.
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that system of jurisprudence."' 9
One tendency which emerges is to accept a limited right of hu-
manitarian intervention, restricting its lawful application to either
very specific circumstances, or to situations involving certain catego-
ries of states.'
20
Despite the fact that there have been serious objections histori-
cally to the incorporation of the doctrine of humanitarian interven-
tion as an established principle of international law, there remains a
growing sentiment in the present era that such a principle does exist.
The continuous reference throughout the twentieth century to the
theory of humanitarian intervention in doctrine and in state practice
supports this thesis. However, if humanitarian intervention does ex-
ist as a principle of international law, it exists as an extraordinary
remedy to be used only under the gravest circumstances.
12 1
B. Application of the Doctrine
An analysis of pronouncements by both pre-UN Charter and
post-UN Charter scholars tends to establish certain criteria gov-
erning humanitarian intervention:
(1) restriction to extreme cases of atrocity and breakdown
of order (such as to shock the conscience of mankind);
(2) proportionality of coercive measures used;
(3) disinterestedness of the intervening state(s) in the sense
of a non-seeking ofparticular interests or individual advantages;
(4) general predilection for collective action under the aus-
pices of a competent international organ;
(5) active participation or passive complicity in the viola-
tions by the sovereign;
(6) compliance with international law regarding the use of
force. 1
22
119. I. PHILLMORE, ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 394, cited in Fonteyne, The Customary
International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention." Its Current Validity Under the
UnitedNations Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203, 218 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fonteyne].
Fonteyne provides an excellent historical analysis of the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention.
120. Id
121. Reisman & McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in HUMANI-
TARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 168 (R. Lillich ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as Protect the lbos].
122. See Fonteyne, supra note 119, at 235; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note
93, at 49-50 (statement of Professor John Moore); Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to
Protect Human Rights, 53 IowA L. REV. 325 (1967).
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These criteria in the post-Charter era are reinforced by international
resolutions and conventions. 23
1. Restriction to Extreme Cases-Overriding Necessity
This criterion looks to the values threatened by the conditions
to be remedied. The general consensus is that the values threatened
must be fundamental, such as the right to life or freedom from tor-
ture, 24 and the deprivation of such rights must be widespread.
What is meant by the term, "deprivation of major, fundamental
human rights" in the post-Charter era? Clearly, widespread loss of
human life would fall within this category. But beyond the right to
life and freedom from torture, the legal line is less clear. An exami-
nation of more recent instruments--the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 125 the (OAS) American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man, 26 and the flow of human rights conven-
tions' 27-is therefore critical.
The Universal Declaration and the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights treats as fundamental rights,128 freedom of move-
ment, 29 freedom of religion and belief,130 freedom of expression,' 3
123. Id
124. Fonteyne, supra note 119, at 259; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 93,
at 49 (statement of Professor John Moore).
125. G.A. Res. 217A, 3 U.N. GAOR Part 1 at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter
cited as Universal Declaration].
126. Reprinted mi LE BLANC, THE OAS AND THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 172-74 (1977) [hereinafter cited as LE BLANC].
127. Eg., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52-58, U.N. Doc. A/6316 [hereinafter cited as Covenant];
American Convention on Human Rights, General Secretariat Organization of American
States Treaty Series 36, at 1-21, OAS Official Records, OEA/SER, A/16.
128. The Charter itself nowhere defines the term "fundamental human rights." The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenants were thus the preliminary steps
toward an elaborate formulation of standards which would have some legally binding force.
It must be remembered, however, that the Universal Declaration was adopted by resolution,
not treaty, and was not intended to be binding upon members.
The subsequent international covenants have been ratified only by a very few states and
thus are not binding upon the majority of states.
129. Universal Declaration, supra note 125, at Article 13; Covenant, supra note 127, at
Article 12.
130. Universal Declaration, supra note 125, at Article 18; Covenant, supra note 127, at
Article 18.
131. Universal Declaration, supra note 125, at Article 19; Covenant, supra note 127, at
Article 19.
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freedom of association, 132 the right to vote freely, 33 the right to par-
ticipate in public affairs, 134 and the right to a standard of living ade-
quate for health and well being. 135 However, of the twenty-nine
articles of the Declaration (and the corresponding articles in the
Covenants), the general consensus has been that the most exigent in
regard to humanitarian intervention are136 those providing that
"every one has the right to life, liberty, and the security of per-
son,"' 137 and that "[n]o one shall be subject to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." 138
To compare, the Carter policy emphasized violations of "polit-
ical rights" as the primary justification for the withdrawal of aid.
Although reference was made to the widespread loss of human life
resulting from the civil war, the absence of sufficient "change" and
of a government sufficiently "democratic" to satisfy United States
standards was a primary target of the United States' attack. 3
9
There is no international instrument defining political rights of
representation or popular participation in terms equating them to
the United States system. Even if "democratic" rights were funda-
mental for purposes of humanitarian intervention, the pertinent in-
struments might be satisfied. As Senator Curtis pointed out in 1977,
when the United States first withdrew aid:14
Visibly, the degree of public participation in the Nicaraguan
political process may not match the North American standards-
but there are few countries that do, and Nicaragua is by no
means a dictatorship in the world of Brezhnev's Russia or Cas-
tro's Cuba. In Nicaragua an opposition not only exists, but is
132. Universal Declaration, supra note 125, at Article 20; Covenant supra note 127, at
Article 22.
133. Universal Declaration, supra note 125, at Article 21(3); Covenant, supra note 127,
at Article 25(b).
134. Universal Declaration, supra note 125, at Article 21(2); Covenant, supra note 127,
at Article 25(a).
135. Universal Declaration, supra note 125, at Article 25(1); International Covenant on
Economic, Social and cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
136. BRIERLY, supra note 49, at 294.
137. Universal Declaration, supra note 125, at Article 3; Covenant, supra note 127, at
Article 9.
138. Universal Declaration, supra note 125, at Article 5; Covenant, supra note 127, at
Article 7.
139. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 18, at 3, 79-80; Rethinking, supra note 4, at 5-6, 29
(statement of Fernando Cruz Vilialba); 123 CONG. REc. S7446 (statement of Sen. Kennedy);
See generally Kirkpatrick, supra note 44 (discussing the Carter Administration approach to
Latin America, emphasizing human rights and politico-economic rights).
140. Economic Aid, supra note 15, at 137-38.
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guaranteed 40% of the seats in the national legislature. While
there is some press censorship, it is almost negligible in relation
to Third World nations. Civil liberties are generally respected
141
In sum, it would appear that the Carter Administration's basis
for its claim of human rights violations was insufficient to warrant
humanitarian intervention. Probably the only evidence in its favor
would be the widespread loss of life. It is questionable to what de-
gree the Nicaraguan government could be held uniquely responsible
for such loss, in light of the effects of civil war. Civil war alone is
probably not sufficient justification for humanitarian intervention.
2. Limited Use of Coercive Measures
This standard requires that coercive measures be proportionate
to the situation sought to be remedied. The principles of relativity
and proportionality are to be used as guidelines to balance the harm
which intervention causes, with the size of the group affected by the
violations, and with the character of the threatened human rights. 14 2
The potential for persistence of the problem and the chance of in-
dependent internal solution should be considered. 43 This includes
the premise that there should be "[n]o unnecessary affectation of the
authority structures" of the target state. 44
The termination of military aid alone would probably satisfy
this criterion. Since the National Guard was the primary perpetra-
tor of the alleged human rights violations, withdrawal of military
training and funding would seem to be a proper and proportional
method to achieve the remedial purpose.
The withholding of economic aid to the rural poor, however,
prior to the withdrawal of military aid, or even in addition thereto,
was a questionable and disproportionate means to effect the stated
remedial goals. The devastating result was to deprive those whom
the United States sought to protect.
In combination, it is therefore arguable that the coercive meas-
141. This generalization has been substantiated. See, e.g., 123 CONG. Rac. 20,189-
20,190 (daily ed. June 21, 1977) (statement of Rep. Murphy). While martial law provided
that certain measures could be carried out in violation of freedoms and civil liberties, there
is little evidence that such measures were in fact taken. The possible exceptions are in re-
gard to the issuance of arrest warrants and in communication of prisoners.
142. Fonteyne, supra note 119, at 259.
143. Id at 259-60.
144. Id at 262.
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ures used by the United States in the name of humanity failed to
satisfy the criterion of proportionality.
3. Relative Disinterestedness of the Intervenor
This principle is a relative notion, which has become almost
obsolete in the modem era. The remaining premise is that the over-
riding motive of the intervening state should be the protection of
human rights, and any national interest should be markedly
subordinate. 1
45
While a change in the "democratic" human rights status of Nic-
aragua might have been in the United States' security interests, it
seems clear that the overriding motive was the protection of human
rights.
4. Possibility of Action by a Competent International
Organization
There is a predilection for collective action where humanitarian
intervention is warranted.1'4 This criterion looks to the actions of
competent international organizations related to the humanitarian
crisis, and to the exhaustion of all peaceful means of settlement.
Collective action was not forthcoming from the UN, 47 proba-
bly because of the politicised nature of the problem. The OAS, per-
haps the most appropriate organ to take action in this instance, 48
did not do so until September 23, 1978, at which time it passed the
resolution urging members to abstain from any action which might
aggravate the Nicaraguan situation. 149 The OAS also sent a three-
nation mediating mission to Nicaragua at that time.' 50
The United States' withholding of aid prior to the 1978 action
by the OAS would appear to be premature and in conflict with the
preference for collective action. The failure of international organi-
zations to take action with requisite speed, however, might be a suf-
ficient justification for unilateral action.' 5'
145. Id at 261.
146. Id at 266-67.
147. The only U.N. action was the passing of a resolution which only took cognizance
of the situation. See supra note 1 at 41.
148. See OAS CHARTER, supra note 100, art. 20.
149. See supra note 1.
150. Id at 56.
151. P. JEssup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 170 (1948).
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5. Compliance with International Law Regarding the Use of
Force
a. The UN Charter
Arguably, the prohibition of Article 2(4) is not against the use
of coercion or force per se, but rather the use of force for specified
unlawful purposes;1 52 "All Members shall refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use offorce against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other man-
ner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations". 53 Since
humanitarian intervention seeks neither a territorial change nor a
challenge to the political independence of the state involved, and
since it is consistent with the humanitarian purposes of the UN, it
should not be precluded by Article 2(4).154 A large majority of UN
delegates, however, have expressed the opinion that intervention to
protect human rights is not permissible under the Charter, and that
Article 2(4) contains an absolute and unconditional prohibition
against force that makes any goal or intention of the state initiating
force irrelevant. 55
Assuming that economic coercion constitutes force, the United
States' actions would probably prove to be in contradiction to this
criterion. Even if economic coercion does not constitute force under
the Charter, the result would probably be the same.
b. The OAS
Economic coercion clearly constitutes force and intervention
under the OAS Charter. Traditionally, whenever a choice has had
to be made between the principle of non-intervention and the affir-
mation of human rights, the American States and the OAS have
placed more emphasis on the principle of non-intervention. 5 6 The
general consensus continues to be that unilateral humanitarian in-
tervention, such as the United States acts of economic coercion, is
not an exception. 5
7
152. Protect the Ibos, supra note 121, at 177.
153. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (emphasis added).
154. Protect the Ibos, supra note 121, at 177.
155. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 93, at 214, 216.
156. LE BLANC, supra note 126, at 11.
157. Id
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C. Conclusion
An analysis of the aforementioned criteria leads to a conclusion
that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, if it exists at all as a
justification or exception to the general principle of non-interven-
tion, could not be applied to the United States actions in Nicaragua.
The failure of the United States to discriminate between "demo-
cratic" principles and grave "fundamental" human rights, as de-
fined by the majority of nations, in and of itself probably precludes
the United States from claiming applicability of the doctrine. When
combined with the disproportionate use of coercive measures, the
prematurity of the unilateral actions taken, and the violation of
OAS standards for the use of force, there appears to be an almost
overwhelming certainty that the doctrine could not be applied, and
that the United States' withdrawal of aid from Nicaragua was there-
fore an illegitimate use of economic coercion.
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